Twelve Minutes in the Gulf: When a Supply Ship Became the Target

The most strategically valuable ship in a modern navy is not always the one bristling with missiles. Sometimes, it is the one carrying them.
In the southern Persian Gulf, a Lewis and Clark–class dry cargo and ammunition ship was making a routine transit from Jebel Ali in the United Arab Emirates toward a replenishment rendezvous near Bahrain.

At 689 feet long and displacing 41,000 tons fully loaded, the vessel was massive—but defenseless. Operated by Military Sealift Command and crewed by 124 civilian mariners, it carried no missiles, no deck guns, no armor. Its holds, however, contained palletized ammunition destined for U.S. Fifth Fleet warships: SM-2 Standard missiles, Evolved Sea Sparrow missiles, naval gun rounds, torpedoes, and thousands of tons of explosive ordnance.

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Without ships like this, destroyers run out of interceptors. Carriers exhaust jet fuel. Fleets become spectators.

On that morning, the supply ship was transiting without escort.

Originally, a Cyclone-class patrol vessel had been assigned to accompany it. But 12 hours earlier, that escort had been diverted to investigate a suspicious contact near the Strait of Hormuz. The diversion was expected to last eight hours. It lasted sixteen. Fifth Fleet assessed the risk as low, based on intelligence reports showing no significant Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN) activity south of a specific latitude in the previous 72 hours.

US Navy Launched Something That Shouldn’t Exist… Iran Can’t Stop It

That intelligence was already 14 hours old.

At 08:34 local time, the ship’s navigation radar detected a contact eight nautical miles away—a vessel moving at moderate speed, consistent with commercial traffic. Five minutes later, five additional contacts emerged from behind the first, apparently masked by radar shadow. All six vessels accelerated simultaneously, increasing from 12 knots to more than 40, heading directly toward the supply ship’s projected course.

The master, a veteran merchant mariner with decades of Gulf experience, immediately recognized the pattern: swarm tactics.

US Navy Launched Something That Shouldn’t Exist… Iran Can’t Stop It

At 08:42, he ordered a distress signal broadcast over international maritime emergency frequencies and secure fleet channels: the vessel was under approach by hostile fast craft and had no defensive capability. He ordered a hard turn to port and maximum speed—20 knots, painfully slow against boats capable of more than twice that velocity. He also directed all crew to interior compartments below decks, minimizing exposure.

Four minutes later, the first shots were fired.

Heavy machine gun bursts struck the ship’s superstructure and bridge wings. Windows shattered. Steel rang under the impact of 14.5 mm rounds. The sound echoed throughout the vessel like sustained hammer blows. One of the attacking boats closed to within 300 meters and fired directly at the waterline, attempting to penetrate below the surface.

US Navy Launched Something That Shouldn’t Exist… Iran Can’t Stop It

The hull plating—commercial-grade steel—was not designed to withstand armor-piercing rounds. At least three penetrations were confirmed along the waterline. Seawater entered a forward ballast compartment. Though not immediately catastrophic, the breach exposed the vulnerability of a ship carrying thousands of tons of ammunition just two decks below.

At 08:49, the master made a critical decision.

He ordered the ship’s fire main activated—not to extinguish flames, but to project high-pressure water over the sides, creating a curtain of spray. Simultaneously, smoke floats were deployed from the stern, filling the ship’s wake with thick orange haze. The improvised measures degraded the attackers’ visibility and targeting precision. Incoming rounds began striking water rather than steel.

US Navy Launched Something That Shouldn’t Exist… Iran Can’t Stop It

Help was already racing toward the scene.

The nearest destroyer, USS Carney, was 32 nautical miles away—too distant for immediate intervention. But its embarked Seahawk helicopter could arrive within minutes. Meanwhile, two F/A-18E Super Hornets conducting combat air patrol from USS Eisenhower were 95 nautical miles south. At full afterburner, they could reach the supply ship in roughly eight minutes.

At 08:51, the jets roared overhead at 500 feet and 450 knots. The sonic shock alone had a psychological effect. Two of the fast boats broke off instantly. On the second pass, flares were deployed as unmistakable warning signals. One more boat retreated. Three continued firing.

Weapons release authorization was granted.

US Navy Launched Something That Shouldn’t Exist… Iran Can’t Stop It

An AGM-65 Maverick missile launched from 1.5 miles away locked onto the thermal signature of the nearest boat. Seconds later, a 300-pound warhead obliterated it. A second Maverick destroyed another vessel with similar precision. The third surviving boat turned and fled toward Iranian waters.

By 08:53, the Seahawk helicopter was overhead, tracking the fleeing craft until it crossed into territorial limits. The engagement ended at 08:55—just 12 minutes after the first shots were fired.

The supply ship sustained 37 confirmed hull impacts, three waterline penetrations, two shattered bridge windows, and one external fire. Four civilian mariners were injured, none fatally. Crucially, the ammunition magazines remained intact.

US Navy Launched Something That Shouldn’t Exist… Iran Can’t Stop It

In the aftermath, the U.S. Navy’s internal assessment was blunt. A vessel carrying thousands of tons of explosives had transited one of the world’s most volatile waterways without dedicated protection. Whether the attackers exploited a known escort gap or acted opportunistically remained unclear. Either possibility was alarming.

Within 30 days, U.S. Central Command issued a directive: no ammunition ship would transit the Persian Gulf without a military escort—no exceptions. Within 90 days, defensive enhancements were quietly added to high-value Military Sealift Command vessels, including mounted chain guns and embarked Navy security teams.

Iranian state media denied responsibility, claiming routine patrol activities and unprovoked American aggression. Satellite data, however, placed the engagement squarely in international waters.

US Navy Launched Something That Shouldn’t Exist… Iran Can’t Stop It

Strategically, the episode revealed a critical vulnerability. Warships may be the visible instruments of power, but logistics vessels are the foundation beneath them. As one intelligence assessment reportedly phrased it: “The warships are the sword. The supply ships are the hand that holds it.”

The supply ship returned to service after repairs. The master received commendation. Procedures were rewritten.

But one question lingers in naval planning rooms: if machine guns nearly triggered catastrophe, what happens when the next attack involves missiles instead?